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USING APPELLATE ADVOCACY TO EXPAND A CIVIL RIGHT TO 
COUNSEL IN CHILD CUSTODY CASES 
Susan M. Finegan & Laura W. Gal* 
INTRODUCTION 
“You have the right to remain silent . . . .  You have the right 
to an attorney . . . .  If you cannot afford an attorney, one will be 
provided for you.”1  Whether from television or from law school, 
most Americans, even children, have heard or read some version of 
a Miranda Warning.  We are familiar with the idea that a person is 
entitled to legal representation when charged with a criminal 
offense punishable with jail time and that, if the accused cannot 
afford an attorney, one will be appointed at the government’s 
expense.2  What if a person’s physical liberty is not at stake, but the 
loss of housing or custody of a child is at risk?  Are there other 
rights so fundamental to our society’s sense of liberty that a right to 
counsel is, or should be, recognized? 
This question has gained increasing attention in recent years, 
as civil courts have grappled with an unprecedented increase in 
unrepresented litigants.3  The American justice system is 
predicated on having a judge preside over a lawsuit involving two 
opposing parties—both represented by counsel.  As a result, the 
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and Popeo, P.C., and is Co-Chair of the Massachusetts Access to Justice Commission.  
Gal and Finegan were the lead counsel in L.B. v. Chief Justice of the Prob. & Family 
Ct. Dep’t, 49 N.E.3d 230 (Mass. 2016) and Guardianship of J.T., 49 N.E.3d 242 (Mass. 
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1.  What Are Your Miranda Rights?, MIRANDAWARNING.ORG, http://
www.mirandawarning.org/whatareyourmirandarights.html [https://perma.cc/5XGY-
QFJR]. 
2.  Id.; see Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436 (1966). 
3.  See CHARLES P. KINDREGAN & PATRICIA A. KINDREGAN, 
COMMONWEALTH OF MASS. THE TRIAL COURT PROB. & FAMILY COURT DEP’T, PRO 
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system of rules that developed over time is often difficult to 
understand by those who must represent themselves.  A single 
party unfamiliar with the rules of litigation can make the process 
more difficult and more resource-consuming for all parties and for 
the courts.  In addition, lack of understanding can lead to lack of 
faith in our system of laws.  To address this phenomenon, court 
systems throughout the country have implemented innovative 
approaches to assist unrepresented litigants, including the 
simplification of court forms, the development of online resources 
in plain language, and the opening of court-service centers with 
court staff available to provide information.  While such efforts are 
laudable, and indeed necessary, it is important that access to justice 
advocates not lose sight of the important roles lawyers play, and 
the impact on outcomes lawyers could have in the cases in which 
litigants must forge ahead without such assistance.  While perhaps 
appointment of counsel for all low-income litigants, in all case 
types, is not realistic from a fiscal standpoint, or necessary from a 
due process perspective, providing lawyers for low-income litigants 
in certain types of cases is not only helpful, it is constitutionally 
required. 
This Article explores an important avenue for the access to 
justice movement: appellate lawyers using the due process clause of 
both the state and federal constitutions to advocate for a 
constitutionally based right to counsel.  Through examination and 
discussion of the Supreme Judicial Court’s (SJC) April 2016 
decision in L.B. v. Chief Justice of the Probate & Family Court 
Department,4 this Article details this approach in the context of 
private child custody actions. 
L.B. is the most recent Massachusetts case to address the 
question: when does a parent have a right to counsel in a custody 
case concerning the parent’s child?  The answer to this question has 
been developing over the past several decades, and the SJC’s 
decision in L.B. marked a significant expansion of this right in cases 
involving a parent versus a non-parent.  It also marked a new 
approach to balancing the rights of parents with the fiscal 
constraints of the state.  In L.B., the court held that an indigent 
parent whose child is under guardianship has a right to counsel if 
the parent presents a “meritorious” claim for: (1) removal of the 
guardianship; or (2) a substantial expansion of parental visitation 
 
4.  L.B., 49 N.E.3d at 232. 
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under the guardianship.5  The decision is interesting both for its 
expansion of the class of proceedings in which a right to counsel 
may exist and for the initial burden the court imposes on pro se 
litigants as a prerequisite to triggering their right to counsel.  The 
creation of the “meritorious” threshold allowed the court to extend 
a right to counsel into a new class of proceedings without 
guaranteeing counsel in all proceedings of the given class.  Future 
appellate advocacy will likely be necessary to determine what 
evidence or assertion is sufficient to trigger the right. 
I. CIVIL RIGHT TO COUNSEL: AN OVERVIEW 
A. National Movement 
A right to counsel in criminal matters was first recognized 
more than fifty years ago in the 1963 landmark Supreme Court 
decision, Gideon v. Wainwright.6  In Gideon, the Court found a 
criminal defendant’s Fourteenth Amendment right to due process 
could not be protected without access to counsel.7  Since that time, 
courts and legislatures have wrestled with the question of when 
indigent litigants have the right to counsel in civil proceedings.  As 
articulated in the Supreme Court’s 1981 decision in Lassiter v. 
Department of Social Services of Durham County, the analysis for 
determining due process rights is complicated, and the answer far 
from straightforward: “[f]or all its consequence, ‘due process’ has 
never been, and perhaps can never be, precisely defined . . . .  
Rather, the phrase expresses the requirement of ‘fundamental 
fairness,’ a requirement whose meaning can be as opaque as its 
importance is lofty.”8 
In Lassiter, the state terminated Abby Lassiter’s (petitioner) 
parental rights to her infant son.  She appealed the termination, 
asserting her due process rights had been violated by the state’s 
failure to provide her with a court-appointed lawyer.9  She could 
not afford a lawyer to represent her at the trial court proceeding 
 
5.  See id. at 241–42.  
6.  Gideon v. Wainwright, 372 U.S. 335 (1963). 
7.  See id. at 341–45. 
8.  Lassiter v. Dep’t of Soc. Servs., 452 U.S. 18, 24 (1981). 
9.  It is noteworthy that Lassiter was decided on federal constitutional grounds.  
The decisions in L.B., and cases leading up to that decision, suggest that state 
constitutions may provide broader protections.  Lassiter did not foreclose recognition 
of a right to counsel in custody or other civil proceedings, but it indicated a restrictive 
view that providing counsel is a necessity to preserving due process.  See id. at 33–34.  
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and argued she could not effectively defend her parental rights 
without one.10  Applying the three-prong balancing test (“Mathews 
Test”) articulated in Mathews v. Eldridge,11 the Court held that 
protection of due process rights of the particular litigant at hand 
did not require appointment of counsel, both because of alternative 
measures taken to protect the litigant’s rights and the litigant’s 
failure to avail herself of other opportunities to protect and 
promote her relationship with her child.12  Nonetheless, the Court’s 
focus on the facts of the individual case left room for future 
litigation of the issue; a different set of circumstances might tip the 
Mathews analysis in the parent’s favor.  Moreover, the court made 
a point of acknowledging that access to counsel may be 
appropriate, even if not constitutionally required: 
In its Fourteenth Amendment, our Constitution imposes on the 
States the standards necessary to ensure that judicial 
proceedings are fundamentally fair.  A wise public policy, 
however, may require that higher standards be adopted than 
those minimally tolerable under the Constitution.  Informed 
opinion has clearly come to hold that an indigent parent is 
entitled to the assistance of appointed counsel not only in 
parental termination proceedings, but also in dependency and 
neglect proceedings as well . . . .  Most significantly, 33 States 
and the District of Columbia provide statutorily for the 
appointment of counsel in termination cases.  The Court’s 
opinion today in no way implies that the standards increasingly 
urged by informed public opinion and now widely followed by 
the States are other than enlightened and wise.13 
In the decades since Lassiter, a national movement to 
recognize a right to counsel in civil cases has gained significant 
momentum.  Proponents of a civil right to counsel advocate that 
self-represented litigants should have counsel in any case affecting 
“basic human needs” such as housing, health, safety, sustenance 
and child custody matters.14 
 
10.  See id. at 24. 
11.  Mathews v. Eldridge, 424 U.S. 319 (1976).  The three-prong balancing test is: 
“(1) the private interest that will be affected by the official action; (2) the risk of an 
erroneous deprivation of such interest through the procedures used, and probable 
value, if any, of additional procedural safeguards; and (3) the Government’s interest, 
including the fiscal and administrative burdens that the additional or substitute 
procedures would entail.”  Id. at 321. 
12.  See Lassiter, 452 U.S. at 32–33.   
13.  Id. at 33–34 (citations omitted). 
14.  See Jillian Jorgenson, Civil Discourses: Lawmakers and Legal Experts Want 
  
2017] APPELLATE ADVOCACY IN CHILD CUSTODY CASES 313 
B. State Initiatives 
Advocates at both state and local levels have pursued a variety 
of approaches to obtain a civil right to counsel.15  This year alone, 
over two dozen bills in multiple state legislatures have been filed 
that would establish or expand a civil right to counsel in varying 
circumstances.16  One of the more promising recent bills hails from 
New York City and guarantees low-income residents an attorney in 
eviction proceedings.17  This bill has garnered substantial political 
support and inspired similar efforts in other states.18  A similar bill 
is now pending in the Massachusetts House of Representatives.19  
In addition to legislative fixes, advocates have tried local pilot 
projects to demonstrate that providing counsel in certain 
circumstances could make a significant difference in case outcomes.  
One such example was a two-court pilot program, which provided 
an attorney in certain categories of eviction cases in Quincy, 
Massachusetts District Court and the Northeast Housing Court.  
These pilot programs were developed through the collaboration of 
the Boston Bar Association, two legal-services organizations 
(Greater Boston Legal Services and Northeast Legal Aid), 
academics from Harvard University, and many others.20  The pilot 
 
to Expand Your Right to a Lawyer, OBSERVER (Aug. 20, 2015, 10:30 PM), http://
observer.com/2015/08/civil-discourse-lawmakers-and-legal-experts-want-to-expand-
your-right-to-a-lawyer/ [https://perma.cc/XW8G-ML8Z].  
15.  See BOS. BAR ASS’N TASK FORCE ON EXPANDING THE CIVIL RIGHTS TO 
COUNSEL, GIDEON’S NEW TRUMPET: EXPANDING THE CIVIL RIGHT TO COUNSEL IN 
MASSACHUSETTS apps. 3 & 4 (Sept. 2008), https://www.bostonbar.org/prs/reports/
GideonsNewTrumpet.pdf [https://perma.cc/FK5M-VJV5] (detailing types of 
Massachusetts cases in which a right to counsel has been found through statute or case 
law).  The National Coalition for a Civil Right to Counsel, a national advocacy 
organization based in Maryland, has a comprehensive list of state-by-state approaches, 
including litigation, legislation, and pilot projects.  See NCCRC, http://www.civilright
tocounsel.org [https://perma.cc/96MF-VXMZ].  
16.  See 2016 Civil Right to Counsel Bills, NCCRC, http://civilrighttocounsel.org/
highlighted_work/legislative_developments/2016_civil_right_to_counsel_bills [https://
perma.cc/7W9C-YC9B].  
17.  See N.Y. State Assemb. S02061B, 2015–2016 Reg. Sess. (N.Y. 2015), 
http://assembly.state.ny.us/leg/?default_fld=&bn=S02061&term=2015&Summary=Y&
Actions=Y&Text=Y&Votes=Y [https://perma.cc/9BV9-U7RV]. 
18.  See Jessica Silver-Greenberg, For Tenants Facing Eviction, New York May 
Guarantee a Lawyer, N.Y. TIMES (Sept. 26, 2016), http://www.nytimes.com/2016/09/
27/nyregion/legal-aid-tenants-in-new-york-housing-court.html?mwrsm=Email&_r=0 
[https://perma.cc/5348-M5KH].  
19.  See H.B. 1560, 189th Gen. Ct., Reg. Sess. (Mass. 2015). 
20.  See BOS. BAR ASS’N TASK FORCE ON EXPANDING THE CIVIL RIGHTS TO 
COUNSEL, THE IMPORTANCE OF REPRESENTATION IN EVICTION CASES AND 
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programs in both communities had a variety of favorable 
outcomes—including preventing evictions and protecting tenants’ 
rights—confirming the essential role that attorneys play in such 
cases. 
In the Quincy pilot, “full representation [] allowed more than 
two-thirds of the tenants in this pilot to avoid the destabilizing 
consequences of eviction, including potential homelessness” and 
these tenants, with the help of an attorney, “also received almost 
five times the financial benefit (e.g., damages, cancellation of past 
due rent) as those without full representation.”21  Last, courts in 
Massachusetts and elsewhere have found a constitutionally based 
civil right to counsel in a number of areas.22 
II. RIGHT TO COUNSEL IN CHILD CUSTODY PROCEEDINGS 
As illustrated by the long list of supporting studies referenced 
in Lassiter, expansion of a civil right to counsel has been 
particularly successful in child custody cases.23  The need for 
counsel in custody proceedings is compelling because the cases are 
complex and the stakes are high.  Presentation of evidence often 
involves expert testimony, decisions are based largely on case-
specific facts, and trial court judges have tremendous discretion to 
assess factors such as the credibility of witnesses.24  Failure to 
effectively present one’s case could result in interference with a 
fundamental right of (wo)man: the right to parent one’s child.25  
 
HOMELESSNESS PREVENTION (Mar. 2012), http://www.bostonbar.org/docs/default-
document-library/bba-crtc-final-3-1-12.pdf [https://perma.cc/L8BV-GCDM]. 
21.  See id. at 2.  While the Northeast Housing Court pilot provided less dramatic 
results for those obtaining full representation, that was likely due to the fact that 
tenants there, whether in the control group or in the full representation group, could 
get access to a lawyer in a lawyer for a day program sponsored by legal aid. See id. at 
18–24. 
22.  See generally Dep’t of Pub. Welfare v. J.K.B., 393 N.E.2d 406 (Mass. 1979) 
(recognizing parents’ right to counsel in termination of parental rights cases). 
23.  See Lassiter v. Dep’t of Soc. Serv. of Durnham Cty., 452 U.S. 18, 39 n.6, 46–
47 n.15–16 (1981).  
24.  See In re Adoption of Meaghan, 961 N.E.2d 110, 111 (Mass. 2012) (noting 
the complexity in J.K.B. is “no less present” in cases between private parties); Bezio v. 
Patenaude, 410 N.E.2d 1207 (Mass. 1980); J.K.B., 393 N.E.2d at 408–09 (noting cases 
“may well involve complex questions of fact and law, and require the marshalling and 
rebutting of sophisticated expert testimony . . . [and] the balance [of rights] to be struck 
is more complex”); Guardianship of Estelle, 875 N.E.2d 515 (Mass. App. Ct. 2007). 
25.  Care and Protection of Jamison, 4 N.E.3d 889, 900–01 (Mass. 2014) (quoting 
Stanley v. Illinois, 405 U.S. 645, 651 (1972)) (noting parental rights “among the 
‘essential’ and ‘basic civil rights of man’”). 
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Parenthood and the autonomy and sanctity of the family unit are so 
fundamental to our society, they are constitutionally protected.26  
As a result, most states have adopted statutory schemes under 
which indigent parents are entitled to legal counsel whenever the 
state seeks to take or maintain custody of the parents’ child(ren).27  
However, prior to enactment of statutory protection, case law first 
established this right in Massachusetts, and litigation continues to 
be an effective tool to ensure that parents’ constitutionally-
protected liberty interests in their relationships with their children 
are protected. 
A. Developing a Right to Counsel One Case at a Time 
Child custody cases present in three categories: (1) those 
pitting one or both parents against the state (e.g., care and 
protection cases and petitions to terminate parental rights filed by 
the Department of Children and Families), (2) those in which a 
private third-party seeks to take custody away from a parent (e.g., 
private adoptions and guardianship of minor petitions), and 
(3) those involving one parent against the other (e.g., divorce 
actions, separate support actions, and paternity actions).  
Recognition of a right to counsel was established earliest in the first 
of these categories and more recently in the second.  Although 
statute provides discretionary access to counsel in the third 
category, a right to counsel has yet to be identified. 
In Massachusetts, statutory law now guarantees an indigent 
parent court-appointed counsel in child custody cases in which the 
Commonwealth is a party.28  Prior to statutory law, the right to 
counsel in custody cases was first recognized through case law.  In 
1979, in J.K.B., the SJC was presented with the question of whether 
an indigent parent is entitled to appointed counsel in a proceeding 
to terminate the parent’s parental rights.29  The court held that 
indigent parents do have a right to a court-appointed lawyer in such 
circumstances because: 
[a]n indigent parent facing the possible loss of a child cannot be 
 
26.  Courts accord “substantial respect” towards “family autonomy . . . a ‘private 
realm of family life which the state cannot enter.’”  Bezio, 410 N.E.2d at 1212 n.6 
(quoting Prince v. Massachusetts, 321 U.S. 158, 166 (1944)). 
27.  Lassiter, 452 U.S. at 34 (“Most significantly, 33 States and the District of 
Columbia provide statutorily for the appointment of counsel in termination cases.”). 
28.  See MASS. GEN. LAWS ch. 119, § 29 (2016). 
29.  Dep’t of Pub. Welfare v. J.K.B., 393 N.E.2d 406, 406 (Mass. 1979). 
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said to have a meaningful right to be heard in a contested 
proceeding without the assistance of counsel . . . .  Provision of 
appointed counsel not only safeguards the rights of the parents, 
but it assists the court in reaching its decision with the ‘utmost 
care’ and ‘an extra measure of evidentiary protection,’ required 
by law.30 
J.K.B. was among the cases the United States Supreme Court 
cited in Lassiter.31  Shortly after the Lassiter decision, the 
Massachusetts legislature created a statutory right to counsel for all 
custody proceedings in which the Department of Children and 
Families is a party.32  This law is still in effect today. 
After the surge of right-to-counsel litigation and legislation in 
the late 1970s and early 1980s, it took more than twenty-five years 
to make the leap from parent versus state custody cases to parent 
versus private third-party custody cases.  In 2012, further litigation 
led to recognition of a right to counsel in privately filed adoption 
petitions.33  In J.K.B., the court highlighted the “vastly superior 
resources for investigation” of the state in comparison to the 
parent.34  In Meaghan, the court shifted focus from the power of the 
state to the importance of the rights at stake, finding that “[w]here 
the petitioner is a private party, the same fundamental, 
constitutionally protected interests are at stake [for the defendant 
parent], and the cost of erroneously terminating the parent’s rights 
remains too high to require an indigent parent to risk it without 
counsel.”35 
The decision in Meaghan opened the door to the consideration 
of other private-custody actions, and legal services agencies quickly 
identified another area of need.  Increasingly, parents were losing 
custody of their children to guardianship of minor petitions filed by 
private parties, often a grandparent or other relative. The 
guardianship statute is an important means by which extended 
family and friends can step in to help parents and children in 
need—many guardianships are done by consent of all parties.  
However, when parties do not agree, problems may arise.  While a 
decree of guardianship does not terminate parental rights, it is 
“permanent” in the sense that the law presumes the child will 
 
30.  Id. at 408. 
31.  See Lassiter, 452 U.S. at 30. 
32.  See MASS. GEN. LAWS ch. 119, § 29 (2011). 
33.  See In re Adoption of Meaghan, 961 N.E.2d 110, 111 (Mass. 2012). 
34.  See J.K.B., 393 N.E.2d at 408. 
35.  In re Adoption of Meaghan, 961 N.E.2d at 113. 
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remain in the guardian’s care and custody until the child reaches 
majority, and there is no statutory obligation for either the court or 
guardian to work toward reunification of parent and child.36  In 
contrast to care and protection law, the guardianship statute does 
not require annual review hearings and does not require any show 
of efforts toward reunification.37  Additionally problematic, it is 
unclear what standard of proof should apply when a parent seeks to 
regain custody.38  Despite these shortcomings in statutory guidance, 
the guardianship statute—unlike the care and protection statute—
has no provision for the appointment of counsel for parents.  This 
disparity of available protections led advocates to question whether 
a parent’s due process rights in a guardianship proceeding were 
adequately protected without legal representation. 
In 2015, lawyers from Northeast Justice Center filed an appeal 
on behalf of a mother whose child was under guardianship, arguing 
her lack of legal counsel at the initial guardianship proceeding had 
left her without due process.39  The SJC took the case on its own 
initiative and held that indigent parents have a right to counsel 
when a third party seeks to take custody from a parent through a 
private-guardianship proceeding.40  Using the same basis found in 
both the J.K.B. and Meaghan decisions, the court reasoned: 
[T]here is every reason, given the fundamental rights that are at 
stake, why an indigent parent is entitled to the benefit of 
counsel when someone other than the parent, whether it be the 
State or a private entity or individual, seeks to displace the 
parent and assume the primary rights and responsibilities for 
the child, whether it be in a care and protection proceeding, a 
termination proceeding, an adoption case, or a guardianship 
proceeding.41 
In contrast to the expansive language in the court’s reasoning, 
the holding in V.V. specifically referenced only chapter 190B, 
section 5-206 of the Massachusetts General Laws, which defines the 
procedure by which a permanent guardian may be appointed for a 
 
36.  See MASS. GEN. LAWS ch. 190B, § 5-202 (2009).   
37.  MASS. GEN. LAWS ch. 119 §§ 29B(a), 29(C). 
38.  See generally Guardianship of Verity, No. 15-P-778, 2016 WL 2941076 (Mass. 
App. Ct. May 19, 2016) (demonstrating the ongoing lack of clarity about standard and 
burden of proof). 
39.  See Guardianship of V.V., 24 N.E.3d 1022, 1024 (Mass. 2015). 
40.  Id. at 1025. 
41.  Id. 
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child.42  The holding contained no mention of section 5-212, which 
defines the procedure by which a decree of guardianship can be 
modified or terminated.43  Although the court made clear that 
parents had the right to counsel at the initial-decree stage of a 
guardianship proceeding, it left open the issue of whether the right 
to counsel extended to post-decree actions to terminate or modify a 
decree of guardianship. 
B. The Decision in L.B. v. Chief Justice of the Probate & Family 
Court Department: New Rights, New Limitations 
Advocates for parents found language in the V.V. decision 
suggestive of a broad right to counsel.  In a footnote, the court 
stated, “[O]ur concern regarding whether a parent is entitled to 
counsel applies to all proceedings related to guardianship.”44  The 
court also observed that a parent’s parental rights are “severely 
circumscribed . . . for as long as the guardianship remains in 
effect.”45  Last, the court also noted that because of the impact a 
guardianship has on a parent-child relationship and 
the particular nature of the fundamental rights at stake, an 
indigent parent whose child is the subject of a guardianship 
proceeding is entitled to, and must be furnished with, counsel in 
the same manner as an indigent parent whose parental rights 
are at stake in a termination proceeding or, similarly, in a care 
and protection proceeding.46 
Given that counsel is statutorily available in all phases in a 
care and protection action, one could conclude from the court’s 
language that the court meant for the right to be expansively 
adopted in guardianship proceedings. 
Advocates interpreted this language as clearly endorsing a 
right to counsel throughout the life of a guardianship.  However, 
Chief Justice Ordoñez of the Massachusetts Probate and Family 
Court, who was responsible for the implementation of the V.V. 
decision, took a more measured approach.  Relying on the specific 
language of the holding in V.V., Chief Justice Ordoñez released a 
guidance memorandum to the Probate and Family Court judges 
defining the right to counsel as limited to the initial-petition, pre-
 
42.  Id. 
43.  See generally id. 
44.  Id. at 1023–24 n.2 (emphasis added). 
45.  Id. at 1024. 
46.  Id. 
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decree, stage: “[T]he right to counsel for indigent parents only 
applies in a Petition to Appoint a Guardian of a Minor.”47 
The contrast between the court’s far-reaching discussion and 
its restrictive holding confounded both lawyers and judges, leading 
almost immediately to further litigation.  On May 6, 2015, 
Community Legal Aid (CLA) utilized a statute that allows for 
Direct Appellate Review by a single justice of the SJC to challenge 
the policy Chief Justice Ordoñez set in her February 20, 2015 
Memorandum.48  CLA filed suit on behalf of two mothers —L.B. 
and C.L.—whose children were under guardianship, challenging 
Chief Justice Ordoñez’s guidance memorandum.  The single justice 
reported the matter to the full SJC panel.  Also on May 4, 2015, a 
trial court judge from Hampden County Probate and Family Court 
reported the same issue to the Appeals Court in Guardianship of 
J.T., and the SJC transferred the case on its own motion.49  Oral 
arguments for the two cases were scheduled together for a single 
presentation of the issue of whether indigent parents of children 
under decrees of guardianship have a right to counsel when seeking 
to regain custody of, or expand visitation with, their children.50  
Members of the private bar agreed to provide pro bono 
representation to the mother of J.T.  These advocates worked with 
CLA to craft a coordinated argument in favor of further expanding 
parents’ right to counsel.  Amicus counsel from Massachusetts Law 
Reform, the Boston Bar Association, Committee for Public 
Counsel Services, and members of the private bar also collaborated 
with lead counsel in developing these arguments. 
Using the Mathews Test—to balance the interests of parents, 
the likelihood that parents might be erroneously deprived of those 
interests, and any conflicting state interests—the court found that 
indigent parents have a limited right to an attorney when trying to 
regain custody or increase visitation of a child under guardianship.51 
In brief summary, the court reasoned that regardless of what 
stage the guardianship proceeding was in, the parents’ liberty 
interests at stake were the same: 
It would be incongruous to recognize the significance of the 
 
47.  L.B. v. Chief Justice of the Prob. & Family Ct. Dep’t, 49 N.E.3d 230, 232 
(Mass. 2016) (emphasis added). 
48.  See MASS. GEN. LAWS ch. 211, § 3 (2012). 
49.  See Guardianship of J.T., 49 N.E.3d 242 (Mass. 2016). 
50.  L.B., 49 N.E.3d at 231. 
51.  See id. 
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parent’s rights for due process purposes at the time those rights 
are first displaced, as we did in Guardianship of V.V., but not to 
do so at the time the parent seeks to regain them.  The 
deprivation at the former stage and the continued deprivation 
at the latter stage are equally real and significant.52 
The court also stressed that “[v]isitation, like custody, is at the 
core of a parent’s relationship with a child[.]”53  Visitation was 
considered especially critical for parents who “aspire[] to regain 
custody at some point” because visitation “provides an opportunity 
to maintain a physical, emotional, and psychological bond” with the 
child and to “demonstrate the ability to properly care for the 
child.”54  Next, the court found the risk of erroneous deprivation of 
these rights was equally significant and substantial: “The risk of 
erroneously adjudicating these fundamental rights and interests of 
parents is no less real at the guardian removal stage than at the 
appointment stage.”55  As the court pointed out, a judge has to 
make “complex determinations” during these stages, “consider[ing] 
numerous factors regarding the child’s best interest and the 
parent’s fitness.”56  The judge not only has to weigh the competency 
of the parent, but also must consider the potential effect the change 
in guardianship will have on the child, including consideration of 
whether or not a substantial guardian-child bond has developed 
and, if so, whether or not the strength and nature of that bond 
renders an otherwise fit parent unfit to care for the bonded child.57  
These complex decisions are not easily made.  Accordingly, the 
court found “[t]he presence of counsel for a parent will both help 
to protect the parent’s rights and interests in this regard and assist a 
judge to ensure accuracy and fairness in his or her adjudications.”58 
Finally, the court considered the state’s interest in “efficient 
 
52.  Id. at 236. 
53.  Id. at 239. 
54.  See id.  
55.  Id. at 236. 
56.  Id. 
57.  A decision to terminate a guardianship is not based on parental fitness alone; 
chapter 190B, section 5-212 of Massachusetts General Laws requires a showing that 
removal is “in the best interest[s]” of the child.  MASS. GEN. LAWS ch. 190B, § 5-212 
(2009). 
58.  L.B., 49 N.E.3d at 237.  The SJC’s language in L.B. seems to confine the right 
to counsel to petitions to remove guardians that would restore a parent’s custody.  See 
id. at 236 n.12.  The extent of a parent’s right to counsel where the child’s other parent 
is the moving party is yet undefined.  See id. 
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and economic administration of its affairs.”59  Similar to the United 
States Supreme Court’s decision in Lassiter, the court in L.B. noted 
that not all cases would require appointment of counsel in order to 
protect due process, for example, in cases where the parents have 
“no hope of prevailing.”60  The court suggested that, although the 
fundamental rights at stake are no different for a parent seeking to 
regain custody than for a parent seeking to retain custody, the risk 
of erroneous deprivation may be lower.61  This may be because in 
post-decree proceedings a parent is typically the moving party and 
could, in some cases, abuse the system with frivolous pleadings, 
whereas, in pre-decree proceedings the parent is defending against 
an action brought by another.  As a result, the court held that, 
whereas due process requires an indigent parent be provided the 
appointment of counsel upon request in pre-decree guardianship 
proceedings, due process requires access to counsel in post-decree 
petitions to remove a guardian or to expand parental visitation only 
where the parent has presented a “meritorious” claim for relief.62 
III. FUTURE LITIGATION 
The decision in L.B. leaves the door open to future appellate 
advocacy on the contours of the right to counsel in this area of 
practice.  Most likely, advocates will push for a clear understanding 
of what is needed to meet the “meritorious claim” standard in L.B.  
Advocates may also continue to seek expansion of a civil right to 
counsel by applying parent versus third-party arguments to parent 
versus parent cases, pushing for automatic appointment of counsel 
for children who are the subjects of guardianship petitions and 
decrees, or promoting the rights and interests of long-term 
guardians faced with petitions for removal. 
A. Meritorious Claim 
Both in the parties’ arguments and in the court’s decision, 
significant attention was paid to what an unrepresented litigant 
could reasonably be expected to present in order to trigger a right 
to counsel.  The issue was addressed in the parties’ briefs, at oral 
 
59.  Id. at 235. 
60.  Id. at 237 (citing Roe v. Att’y Gen., 750 N.E.2d 897, 904 (Mass. 2001), 
quoting Mathews v. Eldridge, 424 U.S. 319, 335 (1976)).  The court noted that having 
counsel in such instances would “add little value.”  Id. 
61.  See id. 
62.  See id. at 242–43. 
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argument, and in the court’s decision.  Petitioners argued that, to 
the extent a limit on the right to counsel were warranted, 
restrictions on the frequency of court reviews, analogous to those 
found in the care and protection statute, would be sufficient.63  
Unlike the decision in V.V., the court in L.B. did not draw parallels 
between guardianship and care and protection proceedings.64  As 
respondent in L.B., Chief Justice Ordoñez asserted the bar should 
be high: an indigent parent petitioning to remove a guardian and 
regain custody of his or her child “should be required to make an 
initial showing that there have been ‘substantial and relevant 
changed circumstances’ since the guardian was appointed.”65  The 
court rejected this approach, stating this proposed burden would 
require a parent to show changed circumstances “in a legally 
significant manner and to a legally cognizable degree” before the 
right to counsel arises.66  Instead, the court settled on a “lighter, less 
technical burden” that would instead require the parent to 
demonstrate “that he or she has a colorable or ‘meritorious’ 
claim.”67 
In settling on the standard of “meritorious,” the SJC was 
careful to define the term as not requiring a showing that is “legally 
significant” or “legally cognizable.”68  The court found, “[i]t would 
be unusual and potentially unfair to require a litigant unaided by 
counsel to make that kind of a legal demonstration before the right 
to counsel arises.”69  The court also provided a number of 
references to the “meritorious” standard in a variety of legal 
contexts to emphasize its ubiquity in Massachusetts case law.70 
 
63.  Impounded Case: SJC-11882, SUFFOLK U. L. SCH., http://www.suffolk.edu/
sjc/archive/2015/SJC_11892.html [https://perma.cc/5QKB-7MJT] (webcast of case 
hearing from Oct. 5, 2015). 
64.  L.B. v. Chief Justice of the Probate and Family Court Dep’t, 49 N.E.3d 230 
(Mass. 2016). 
65.  Id. at 238. 
66.  Id. 
67.  Id. 
68.  Id. 
69.  Id. 
70.  Id. (citing In re Gen. Motors Corp., 182 N.E.2d 815 (Mass. 1962) (“A 
meritorious case means one that is worthy of presentation to a court, not one which is 
sure of success”)); see also id. at 239 n.17 (citing Commonwealth v. Gunter, 945 N.E.2d 
386 (Mass. 2011)); Lovell v. Lovell, 176 N.E. 210, 211 (Mass. 1931) (stating that a 
petition to remove default decree requires a meritorious claim or defense to assert 
“one which is worthy of judicial inquiry”); Jones v. Manns, 602 N.E.2d 217, 222 n.9 
(Mass. App. Ct. 1992) (involving “meritorious issues, in the usual sense of that phrase 
in appellate practice” i.e., “worthy of presentation to a court”); Commonwealth v. 
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Despite the terms’ broad and varied application, its meaning in 
the context of a custody case is unclear.  Indeed, while 
“meritorious” may be a familiar standard to the court, it may not 
be self-evident to unrepresented litigants.  What does meritorious 
mean in the context of a parent seeking to regain custody or 
increase visitation?  If a parent consented to the guardianship at its 
inception, is withdrawal of consent sufficient to establish a 
meritorious claim for removal of the guardianship?  Is completion 
of a drug rehabilitation program sufficient?  Is it sufficient if a 
previous attempt at sobriety was not successful?  Is a claim that a 
guardian refuses to allow visitation, or enough visitation, sufficient 
to merit a right to counsel?  Where the court will draw the line 
between claims that are meritorious and claims that are not 
remains to be seen, and the ability of parents to challenge adverse 
rulings pro se is questionable.  Interpretation of the meaning of 
meritorious in a custody case may still approach the boundary of 
requiring self-represented parents to interpret questions of law 
without counsel. 
B. Further Expansion of a Parent’s Right to Counsel 
It is noteworthy that many of the factors justifying a right to 
counsel in parent versus third-party custody cases are also present 
in parent versus parent custody cases.  In J.K.B., the court observed 
parental termination cases often involve “complex questions of fact 
and law” and the “marshalling and rebutting of sophisticated 
expert testimony” and found “appointed counsel not only 
safeguards the rights of the parents, but it assists the court . . . .”71  
The same can be said of many custody battles, which pit one 
parent’s fundamental rights against those of the other, while the 
child(ren)’s rights and best interests hang in the balance.  In 
Meaghan, the court held that the same issues and same 
complexities identified in J.K.B. warranted access to counsel even 
in cases between private parties, so the absence of the state in 
parent versus parent cases does not lessen the risk to parents’ 
fundamental rights.72  The court in V.V. found access to counsel 
 
Levin, 388 N.E.2d 1207, 1210 (Mass. App. Ct. 1979) (meritorious standard “connotes 
opposite of frivolous” in context of stay of execution); Tisei v. Bldg. Inspector of 
Marlborough, 330 N.E.2d 488, 489 (Mass. App. Ct. 1975) (on motion for leave to 
docket appeal, moving party must show “a case meritorious or substantial in the sense 
of presenting a question of law deserving judicial investigation and discussion”). 
71.  Dep’t of Pub. Welfare v. J.K.B., 393 N.E.2d 406, 408 (Mass. 1979).  
72.  See In re Adoption of Meaghan, 961 N.E.2d 110, 112 (Mass. 2012). 
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necessary even in cases in which parental rights were merely at risk 
of suspension, not termination.73  And, finally, in L.B., the court 
recognized the importance of visitation alone in protecting and 
maintaining a parent’s right to a relationship with one’s child.74  
Are these arguments applicable to parent versus parent custody 
cases? 
The legislature has recognized that access to counsel may be 
critical in some cases between parents, and has provided courts 
discretionary power to allocate marital funds to pay for a party’s 
representation or, in the case of never-married parents, to appoint 
counsel for either party.75  A 1989 SJC study found that lack of 
access to attorneys had created a justice gap for women, in 
particular, and encouraged invocation of chapter 208, section 17 of 
Massachusetts General Laws as a means of relief.76  “[T]here is too 
little legal help available to moderate-income women, in part 
because judges fail to award adequate counsel fees, especially 
during the pendency of litigation. . . .  Judges must award adequate 
attorney fees during the pendency of litigation.”77  To what extent 
this gap remains today is unknown, however, the number of 
unrepresented litigants in the Probate and Family Courts has 
increased and now sits at above fifty percent, suggesting the 
discretionary authority to appoint counsel is insufficient to meet 
the needs of today’s litigants.78  While a right to counsel in a parent 
versus parent custody case has yet to be recognized by either the 
legislature or the courts, perhaps the case for appointed counsel 
could be made in the future. 
C. Right to Counsel for Children 
If, as the court held in V.V. and L.B., there is a constitutionally 
 
73.  See id. 
74.  See L.B., 49 N.E.3d at 239–242.  
75.  See MASS. GEN. LAWS ch. 208, § 17 (2015); MASS. GEN. LAWS ch. 209C, § 7 
(2015). 
76.  See RUTH I. ABRAMS & JOHN M. GREANEY, REPORT OF THE GENDER 
BIAS STUDY OF THE SUPREME JUDICIAL COURT 20 (1989).  
77.  Gender Bias Study of the Supreme Judicial Court, 24 NEW ENG. L. REV. 745, 
764–67 (1990). 
78.  See MASS. ACCESS TO JUSTICE COMM’N, FINAL REPORT OF THE SECOND 
MASSACHUSETTS ACCESS TO JUSTICE COMMISSION 7 (April 2015), 
http://www.mass.gov/courts/docs/sjc/docs/massachusetts-access-to-justice-commission-
final-report-april-2015.pdf [https://perma.cc/Z3X2-YFX9] (stating that, “[i]n the 
Probate and Family Court, . . . an estimated 50 to 75% of all litigants statewide are 
unrepresented”). 
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based right to counsel for parents in guardianship proceedings, 
would the court also find that children have a similar right?  In 
L.B., the court declined to address whether children have their own 
right to counsel in guardianship removal proceedings.79  This may 
be because, by statute, a child is entitled to appointed counsel in 
some circumstances. Specifically, chapter 190B of the 
Massachusetts General Laws requires for the appointment of 
counsel to children in any of three instances: (1) the child asks the 
court for counsel, although it is unclear how a child would know to 
ask for counsel; (2) a parent or guardian asks the court to appoint 
counsel on behalf of the child, which assumes an adult  knows to 
ask and chooses to do so; or (3) the trial judge sua sponte orders 
the appointment of counsel for the child, which relies on the trial 
judge’s discretion.80  Until the court reviews this issue, it will remain 
unsettled whether the statute sufficiently protects a child’s 
fundamental liberty interests, and yet it is hard to imagine 
circumstances in which the matter would properly be brought to 
the court’s attention.  A child would need legal counsel to make 
such an argument, and the argument would be moot if the child had 
counsel.  Given that advocates for a child’s right to counsel have 
this especially challenging hurdle to clear, the legislature may be a 
more effective venue to amend the current statute to allow for an 
absolute right to counsel.  Protection of children is a politically safe 
and noble ground to walk; perhaps advocates should shift attention 
away from the courts and seek a statutory fix instead. 
D. Right to Counsel for Guardians 
What about the rights of non-parents who have, nonetheless, 
created family bonds with a child?  The questions of who is a 
parent and what constitutes family have been garnering attention 
and challenges to traditional definitions have been getting positive 
results.  This past fall, the SJC found that a person who has acted as 
a parent to the child of another may have standing to establish his 
or her parenthood under chapter 209C of the Massachusetts 
General Laws, regardless of biology and in spite of the parties not 
being married.81  Does this open the door to recognizing a right to 
 
79.  See L.B., 49 N.E.3d at 237. 
80.  See MASS. GEN. LAWS ch. 190B, § 5-202 (2009).  
81.  See Partanen v. Gallagher, 59 N.E.3d 1133 (Mass. 2016).  “[I]t is apparent 
that a biological connection is not a sine qua non to the establishment of parentage 
under G.L. c. 209C.”  Id. at 4. 
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counsel for non-parents in custody cases? 
In the context of guardianship, a limited statutory right to 
counsel already exists, and advocates are pushing for broader 
access to court-appointed attorneys for long-time parental figures.82  
A case recently decided in the Massachusetts Supreme Judicial 
Court asks for recognition of a guardian’s right to counsel in 
private guardianship cases.83  It is noteworthy that, as recently as 
2014, the SJC contrasted the fundamental rights of parents with the 
limited rights of guardians, noting that guardians are “solely 
creatures of statute.”84 This characterization undermines the 
guardians’ argument.  Without a fundamental right to anchor 
guardians’ due process rights, it is difficult to see a path to a 
constitutionally based right to counsel for guardians. 
CONCLUSION 
Efforts to expand a civil right to counsel continue, and there is 
plenty of interesting work to be done, both in the context of child 
custody and beyond.  Whether watching the implementation of the 
L.B. decision with an eye toward protecting and expanding this 
newly identified right to counsel, looking for opportunities to apply 
the right-to-counsel analysis to other custody proceedings, or 
lobbying the legislature for a child’s right to counsel in custody 
proceedings or a tenant’s right to counsel in eviction proceedings, 
opportunities await and advocates are needed. 
 
 
82.  See MASS. GEN. LAWS ch. 119, § 29 (2011) (providing that guardians of 
children who subsequently become subjects of care and protection proceedings, if 
indigent, are entitled to court-appointed counsel). 
83.  See Guardianship of K.N., 476 Mass. 762 (2017).  
84.  See Care & Prot. of Jamison, 4 N.E.3d 889 (Mass. 2014).  
